Question
Help with Game Theory!

(10) Suppose that a, b, e, d, e, f,9, and h are real numbers that are all different. For the following game, select the correct answer among the choices below. Player 2 LIR U a, b c, d It is possible that this game has exactly twO NEPS 0 It is possible that this game has exactly three NEPS It is possible that this game has exactly four NEPS It is impossible that this game has zero NEPS
0 0
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Answer #1

All these numbers are different then chances of having more than 2 PSNE are none.

Because to have 3 out of 4 values then we must have equality between these numbers atleast once which is not the case here

Let's see if a>e and c>g then we have one NE for sure

If a>e and c<g & b<d ,f>h then no Pure Straegy Nash EquiiliEqui

If a>e , c<g & b<d, f<h then one PSNE

If a>e, c<g & b>d, f<h then we have 2 PSNE

Hence it is possible to have no PSNE, 1 PSNE or 2 PSNE.

Option A is correct

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