7. For each of the following games, draw the movement diagram and then find the Nash...
2. [7 points) Find all the Nash equilibrium (pure and mixed strategies) in the following games. a) (2 points) column left middle right 5,2 2,1 1,3 4,0 1,-1 0,4 row up down 10 column left right b) [2 points] row L up 1,1 -1.0 down -1,0 1,1 c) [3 points] left 3,3 4,6 11,5 up middle down column middle right 9,4 5,5 | 0,0 6,3 5,4 0,7 row
Questions 7-10 For each of the following games, please identify the Nash equilibrium or equilibria. (There may be none, or multiple). Note: assume the payoffs in the boxes are "positive" -- i.e. higher numbers represent better payoffs. Player 1 Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 #2 Strategy A 20 B 100 #1 20 No a Strategy No 5 100 Player 2 Strategy Strategy Player 1 Strategy #1 Strategy Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 #2 15 R 50 70 20 x 20...
Questions 7-10 For each of the following games, please identify the Nash equilibrium or equilibria. (There may be none, or multiple). Note: assume the payoffs in the boxes are "positive"- i.e. higher numbers represent better payoffs. Player 2 Strategy Strategy #2 ii Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 #1 # 2 R 50 20 Strategy 15 20 100 Strategy 70 20 #1 #1 10 10 20 5 Strategy Strategy 70 Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 60 100 #2 15 Player 2...
Nash Equilibrium of Bimatrix games It's the questions asking us to find all Nash Equilibria (um) I'm not 100% sure that I did it in a right way or not. Would anyone let me know how to approach the questions, showing all works? Thanks in advance. 1.P50,500,100 T100,0 0,0 R 0,01,11,-1 P1,-1 0,0-1,1 S-1,11,-10,0 3.B3,20,0 S0,02,3 4. C8,8 0,9 D 9,0 1,1
Find the Nash equilibria of the games. X Y X Y Z 0,4 U 2,0 1,1 3,3 3,3 M 3,4 1,2 2,3 | 0,2 3,0 (b) Y Z 5,1 0,2 U 8,6 8,2 M 0,1 4,6 6,0 M 1,0 2,6 5,1 2,1 3,5 2,8 2,8 0,8 4,4 х 0,0 8,10 4,1 3,10 4,1 B 0,0 3,3 6,4 8,5 6,4 8,5
#1. (30 points) Consider the following normal-form game. (a) (10 points) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) (20 points) Find all mixed strategy Nash equilibria. EFG | A 0,0 3, 4, 1 B5,5 0,01,-1 C 2.0 1,0 2,6 D 1,0 1,4 6,3
For each tree, find all pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE), and all pure strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). In every tree, payoffs are in alphabetical order. You can gain up to 10 points per tree (5 points for NE, 5 points for SPNE). Ann Ann Bob Bob Bob 2 2.2 1,0 2.2 2,0 Tree 1 Tree 2 Ann Ann Bob Bob 1,1 1,1 1,1 10 o,I 1,0 Tree 3 Tree 4
6. Consider the following game: a. Identify all Nash Equilibria (Pure Strategy and Mixed) of this simultaneous game. b. Draw the two extensive form games that arise from each firm moving first. What are the Subgame Perfect Equilibria of these games? c. Identify a trigger strategy for each player that sustains (B,B) as an equilibrium. For what interest (discount) rates will this outcome be sustainable?
Consider the following extensive form game P1 RP:2 L2 R2 L1 R1 (2,2) (0,3) 1. How many sub-games are there in this game? What is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium? 2. Represent this game as a Normal form game and find all pure strategy Nash Eq. Is there a mixed Nash eq. in this game? If yes, show one. If not, argue why not 3. Now assume that P2 cannot observe P1's action before he makes his move. As such, he...
Find the Nash equilibria of and the set of rationalizable strategies for the games 2 2 L R L С R 3,3 2,0 A 5,9 0, 1 U 4,3 В 4,1 8,- 3,2 М 0,9 1,1 D 0,1 2, 8 8,4 (а) (b) 2 2 1 W X Y Z R 3,6 4, 10 5,0 U 0,8 U 0,0 1, 1 2,6 3, 3 4, 10 1,1 0,0 5,5 D 1,5 2,9 3,0 4,6 (d) (c) L M