Find the rationalizable strategies in the following game (Detailed problem-solving process)
1/2 | A | B | C |
A | 3,5 | 2,5 | 1,2 |
B | 3,2 | 0,0 | 0,1 |
C | 2,0 | 1,4 | 5,2 |
For player 1 strategy B is weakly dominated by A because among A and B 3=3, 2>0 and 1>0. Therefore for player 1, A is dominating strategy than B. So as a rational player player 1 will never play B. So A is rational strategy for player 1. Now we eliminate strategy B from player-1's strategy space. If we remove strategy B from player-1's matrix payoff then we get the following payoff matrix.
1/2 | A | B | C |
A | 3,5 | 2,5 | 1,2 |
C | 2,0 | 1,4 | 5,2 |
Now from player 2's point of view strategy C is strictly dominated by strategy B. So player 1 can think that as a rational player 2 will not play strategy C. So here strategy B is rational strategy for player 2 given this payoff matrix. Now if player 1 remove strategy C from payoff matrix then we can get the following payoff matrix.
1/2 | A | B |
A | 3,5 | 2,5 |
C | 2,0 | 1,4 |
From here we can say for player 1 strategy C is strictly dominated by strategy A because 3>2, 2>1. So for player 1 A is dominating than C. So for player 1, A is rational strategy. From player 2's point of view player 2 can remove strategy C from player 1's strategy matrix. So strategy A is rational for player 1. Now after removing strategy C the payoff matrix becomes like following.
1/2 | A | B |
A | 3,5 | 2,5 |
In the above payoff matrix the there is no rational strategy for player 2 because for both strategy A and B we have the value 5.
So rationalizable strategies for player 1 are strategy A for player 1 and strategy B for player 2.
Find the rationalizable strategies in the following game (Detailed problem-solving process) 504 A3. 33-2 ABC
Problem #3: Strictly dominated and non-rationalizable strategies (6 pts) Below, there are three game tables. For each one, identify which strategies are non-rationalizable (if any), and which strategies are strictly dominated (if any). Do this for both players in each game. Note: You don't need to use IESDS or IENBR in this problem: I only want to know which strategies are strictly dominated or non-rationalizable in the games as presented. Rogers Go Rogue Go Legit 2,3 3,4 3,2 5,1 3,1...
For each of the following normal-form game below, find the rationalizable strategy profiles, using IENBRS, Iterated Elimination of Never a Best Response Strategies. (1)/(2) L C R (3,2) (4,0) (1,1) (2,0) (3,3) (0,0) (1,1) (0,2) (2,3)
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
5. (i) Consider a Cournot quantity setting game of simultaneous moves. Solve for the rationalizable strategies (quantities) for the two firms that simultaneously choose quantities to produce, which then determines the price at which the produced goods will sell. The marginal cost of production is 4 for firml and 2 for firm 2. P = 40-91-92 Find the equilibrium price and the profits of each firm. (15) ii) Now model the game as a sequential move game where firm 1...
Find the Nash equilibria of and the set of rationalizable
strategies for the games
2 2 L R L С R 3,3 2,0 A 5,9 0, 1 U 4,3 В 4,1 8,- 3,2 М 0,9 1,1 D 0,1 2, 8 8,4 (а) (b) 2 2 1 W X Y Z R 3,6 4, 10 5,0 U 0,8 U 0,0 1, 1 2,6 3, 3 4, 10 1,1 0,0 5,5 D 1,5 2,9 3,0 4,6 (d) (c) L M
Problem #2: Nash Equilibrium with Continuous Strategies (8pts) Consider a game with continuous strategies, in which the two players have the following continuous payoff functions: (S1,2)= (20-4s,)s,-s 2(s1,82) (20-6s)s-s The players choose their strategies from the set s, E (-00, 00). a) Find a best-response function for cach firm. b) Using your answer to part a), solve for the Nash Equilibrium of this game.
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1. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form: T4,5 3,0 0,2 M 5,2 2, 1,0 B0,02,84,2 (a) What strategies are rationalizable? (b) What strategies survive the iterative elimination of strictly dominant strategies? (c) What strategies are ruled out by the assumption of rationality alone (i.e, without the assumption of common knowledge)? (d) Find all pure-strategy nash equilibria.
1. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form: T4,5...
Consider the following two player game. The players’ strategy
spaces are SA = {a1, a2, a3} and SB = {b1, b2, b3, b4}.
(d) Derive all the rationalizable strategy profiles.
(e) Derive the players’ best reply correspondences.
(f) Compute all the Nash equilibria of the game
A\В by 2, 2 3, 1 8,0 3, 6 а1 3, 1 0, 6 1, 4 1, 0 а2 4, 2 1, 1 2, 2 4, 4 аз
A\В by 2, 2 3, 1...
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
Find the optimum strategies for player A and player B in the game represented by the following payoff matrix. Find the value of the game. -3 1/5 0 -2