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Consider the game: 312 1 1) Does either player have a dominated strategy? 2) Does either player have a pure prudent strategy?

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Answer #1

(1) Yes, For player 1 "F" dominated by "D" and for player 2 "C" dominated by "A".

(2) A prudent strategy maximizes a player’s minimum possible pay-off. Player 1’s (pure) prudent strategy is D. Player 2’s (pure) prudent strategy is A.

(3) No, there have no saddle-points in pure strategies. Because there is no common value of Max-Min and Min-Max.

Row Min A B C 0 3 -12 E 1 1 -4 FL-2 03 Col3 1 3 1-4 Max-Min \neq Min-Max

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