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Consider the voluntary contribution to building a fence game discussed in class. Assume that v1-v2-100 and...
Consider the voluntary contribution to building a fence game discussed in class. Assume that v1 =...
Consider the voluntary contribution to building a fence game discussed in class. Assume that v1 = v2=100 and C=150, and select all that apply. a. It is efficient to build the fence. b. Contributing more than her own valuation is a strictly dominated strategy for each player. c. Each player donating 100 is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. d. There are Nash equilibria in which the fence is not built.
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which...
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which BOTH Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of "a" when the strategy profile played is (B,D). Select the correct answer. If a-1 then strategy B is strictly dominated If a-3/2 then the game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. For all values of "a" strategy A is strictly dominant. For small enough values of "a", the profile (A,D) is a pure strategy...
(20 points) Exercise 3: (Midterm 2018) Consider the following normal-form game, where the pure strategies for...
(20 points) Exercise 3: (Midterm 2018) Consider the following normal-form game, where the pure strategies for Player 1 are U, M, and D, and the pure strategies for Player 2 are L, C, and R. The first payoff in each cell of the matrix belongs to Player 1, and the second one belongs to Player 2. Player 2 IL CR u 6,8 2,6 8,2 Player 1 M 8,2 4,4 9,5 8,10 4,6 6,7 (7) a) Find the strictly dominated (pure)...
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L...
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Q2 Contribution Game Consider the following game. There are four players. Each player i (wherei 1,2,3,4)...
Q2 Contribution Game Consider the following game. There are four players. Each player i (wherei 1,2,3,4) si multaneously and independently selects her contribution s E [0, 10]. Each player gets a benefit related to all of the players choices of s,'s, but incurs a cost related to her own contribution s In particular, the payoff to each player i is given by: ul (s1 , s2, s3, s.) = si + s2 + s3 + 84-0.5s (a) Find best response...
Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10...
Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10 and v2=10. Select all that apply. a. Bidding a value b1 equal to her own valuation vy is a weakly dominated strategy for bidder D. Both bidders submitting bids equal to 10 is a Nash equilibrium. C. One bidder submitting a bid equal to 10 and the other submitting a bid equal to 0 is a Nash equilibrium. d. Both bidders submitting bids equal...
Consider the following game: Player2 U Player 1 M 100.99 0.0 99 100 0.0 1.1 0.0...
Consider the following game: Player2 U Player 1 M 100.99 0.0 99 100 0.0 1.1 0.0 99. 10000 100.99 a. Does player 1 have a strictly dominant strategy? If the answer is yes, write the dominant strategy in the specified area and if the answer is no just write no b. Does player 2 have a strictly dominant strategyIf the answer is yes, write the dominant strategy in the specified area and if the answer is no just write no...
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an...
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an indivisible object. Denote by vi the value player i attaches to the object; if she obtains the object at the price p her payoff is vi −p. Assume that the players’ valuations of the object are all different and all positive; number the players 1 through n in such a way that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn > 0....
Declining Industry: Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably....
Declining Industry: Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably. Each firm has three possible choices, as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Each quarter that both firms operate yields each a loss equal to -1, and each quarter that...
Consider the finite 2 player game, representing price competition in a market where al costumers buy...
Consider the finite 2 player game, representing price competition in a market where al costumers buy from the seller with the lowest price. Both sellers simultaneously choose price, p1 and p2, where pi is in P = {0,1,2,3,4}. The profits to each seller are given in the payoff bi-matrix below, where seller 1 chooses row and seller 2 column. Firm 2 p=0 p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4 p=0 -5,-5 -10,0 -10,0 -10,0 -10,0 p=1 0,-10 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 p=2 0,-10...
Player lI A 6,6 2,0 В 0,1 а,а Player Consider the game represented above in which BOTH Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of "a" when the strategy profile played is (B,D). Select the correct answer. If a-1 then strategy B is strictly dominated If a-3/2 then the game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. For all values of "a" strategy A is strictly dominant. For small enough values of "a", the profile (A,D) is a pure strategy...
(20 points) Exercise 3: (Midterm 2018) Consider the following normal-form game, where the pure strategies for Player 1 are U, M, and D, and the pure strategies for Player 2 are L, C, and R. The first payoff in each cell of the matrix belongs to Player 1, and the second one belongs to Player 2. Player 2 IL CR u 6,8 2,6 8,2 Player 1 M 8,2 4,4 9,5 8,10 4,6 6,7 (7) a) Find the strictly dominated (pure)...
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Q2 Contribution Game Consider the following game. There are four players. Each player i (wherei 1,2,3,4) si multaneously and independently selects her contribution s E [0, 10]. Each player gets a benefit related to all of the players choices of s,'s, but incurs a cost related to her own contribution s In particular, the payoff to each player i is given by: ul (s1 , s2, s3, s.) = si + s2 + s3 + 84-0.5s (a) Find best response...
Consider a second-price sealed-bid auction as the one analyzed in class. Suppose bidders' valuations are v1-10 and v2=10. Select all that apply. a. Bidding a value b1 equal to her own valuation vy is a weakly dominated strategy for bidder D. Both bidders submitting bids equal to 10 is a Nash equilibrium. C. One bidder submitting a bid equal to 10 and the other submitting a bid equal to 0 is a Nash equilibrium. d. Both bidders submitting bids equal...
Consider the following game: Player2 U Player 1 M 100.99 0.0 99 100 0.0 1.1 0.0 99. 10000 100.99 a. Does player 1 have a strictly dominant strategy? If the answer is yes, write the dominant strategy in the specified area and if the answer is no just write no b. Does player 2 have a strictly dominant strategyIf the answer is yes, write the dominant strategy in the specified area and if the answer is no just write no...
Declining Industry: Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably. Each firm has three possible choices, as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Each quarter that both firms operate yields each a loss equal to -1, and each quarter that...
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