Consider the following entry game. Virgin Blue can enter the market (E) or decide to not...
Consider the following entry game. Virgin Blue can enter the market (E) or decide to not enter (NE). If they choose NE Qantas gets a profit of 20 and Virgin gets a profit of 5. If Virgin chooses to E, Qantas can then choose to either punish (P) or accommodate (A). If Qantas choose P the payoffs are 7 for Qantas and ‐5 for Virgin. If Qantas opts to A the payoffs are 8 to each party. Draw the normal form of the game and determine all of the pure strategy Nash equilibria. Define a subgame perfect equilibrium. What is the SPE in this game?
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Consider the following entry game. Virgin Blue can enter the
market (E) or decide to not...
Tiger is considering entering the Australian domestic airline industry. If can choose to not enter (NE)...
Tiger is considering entering the Australian domestic airline industry. If can choose to not enter (NE) or to enter (E). If it NEs, the payoffs are 20 for itself, and 70 for Qantas. If Tiger Es, this is observed by Qantas, who can then choose to punish (P) or to cooperate (C). If Qantas opts for P following E, the payoffs are (10,20) to Tiger and Qantas, respectively. If Qantas chooses C following E, the payoffs are (30, 30). What...
In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1...
In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has______________ pure strategy Nash equilibria and__________ pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The maximum payoff Player 2 gets in a SPNE is___________ . (Please, enter only numerical answers like: 1, 2,...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, Tl and T2....
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, Tl and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects Pl or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses P1 the payoffs are (12, 8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses T1 and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20, 7); if A chooses T2...
5. Consider the dynamic game represented by the game tree below. In this game, a buyer...
5. Consider the dynamic game represented by the game tree below. In this game, a buyer decides wether a relationship-specific investment with a supplier. If the buyer chooses to contract with the supplier, the supplier can attempt to raise the price agreed upon price of the input. If the supplier raises the price, the buyer is then forced to choose whether to keep the supplier at the new raised price or find a new supplier Find all the Nash equilibria....
Consider a game between an employer (E) and a worker (W). The worker can choose to...
Consider a game between an employer (E) and a worker (W). The worker can choose to work hard (H) or slack (S); the employer can dock the worker's pay (D) or not (N). The worker gets enjoyment worth a 1 from slacking, but hurt worth − 2 from docked pay. Thus, a worker who works hard and whose pay is not docked gets a 0; one who slacks and whose pay is docked gets 1 − 2 = −1; and...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2....
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects P1 or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses Pl the payoffs are (12.8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses TI and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20,7); if A chooses T2 and B...
6. The following stage game is played repeatedly for 2 periods. Note that both players observe...
6. The following stage game is played repeatedly for 2 periods. Note that both players observe the decisions made in period 1 before they play again in period 2. The final payoffs to each player are the sum of the payoffs obtained in each period. 112 L R T 1,1 5,0 B 0,3 7,7 (a) Represent this game in extensive form (tree diagram. How many subgames are there? (b) Using backward induction, find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPE) in...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1 and 2. a). Find the pure-strategy Nash...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose A or B. The game ends if she chooses A while it continues to Bob if she chooses B. Bob then can choose C or D. If he chooses C the game ends, and if he chooses D the game continues to Alice. Finally, Alice can choose E or F and the game ends after each of these choices. a. Present this game as...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The tab...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
Tiger is considering entering the Australian domestic airline industry. If can choose to not enter (NE) or to enter (E). If it NEs, the payoffs are 20 for itself, and 70 for Qantas. If Tiger Es, this is observed by Qantas, who can then choose to punish (P) or to cooperate (C). If Qantas opts for P following E, the payoffs are (10,20) to Tiger and Qantas, respectively. If Qantas chooses C following E, the payoffs are (30, 30). What...
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, Tl and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects Pl or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses P1 the payoffs are (12, 8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses T1 and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20, 7); if A chooses T2...
5. Consider the dynamic game represented by the game tree below. In this game, a buyer decides wether a relationship-specific investment with a supplier. If the buyer chooses to contract with the supplier, the supplier can attempt to raise the price agreed upon price of the input. If the supplier raises the price, the buyer is then forced to choose whether to keep the supplier at the new raised price or find a new supplier Find all the Nash equilibria....
2. Consider the following sequential game. Player A can choose between two tasks, TI and T2. After having observed the choice of A, Player B chooses between two projects P1 or P2. The payoffs are as follows: If A chooses TI and B chooses Pl the payoffs are (12.8), where the first payoff is for A and the second for B; if A chooses TI and B opts for P2 the payoffs are (20,7); if A chooses T2 and B...
6. The following stage game is played repeatedly for 2 periods. Note that both players observe the decisions made in period 1 before they play again in period 2. The final payoffs to each player are the sum of the payoffs obtained in each period. 112 L R T 1,1 5,0 B 0,3 7,7 (a) Represent this game in extensive form (tree diagram. How many subgames are there? (b) Using backward induction, find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPE) in...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
Problem 1. (20 points) Consider a game with two players, Alice and Bob. Alice can choose A or B. The game ends if she chooses A while it continues to Bob if she chooses B. Bob then can choose C or D. If he chooses C the game ends, and if he chooses D the game continues to Alice. Finally, Alice can choose E or F and the game ends after each of these choices. a. Present this game as...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
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