Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D are strategies and...
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select all that apply.
| a. |
If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is a Nash equilibrium. |
|
| b. |
If b > f and d = h then D is weakly dominated. |
|
| c. |
If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that |
|
| d. |
If a > b and e > f then (A,D) is Pareto efficient. |
Homework Answers
In the game above, A,B and C will be true. The Nash equilibrium will be where each player will do the best they can given what the other person has done. Thus A,B and C will be true.
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Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D
are strategies and...
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D are strategies and...
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D
are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select
all that apply.
a.
If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is
a Nash equilibrium.
b.
If b > f and d = h then D is weakly dominated.
c.
If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that
.
d.
If a > b...
Player II Player a,b B cdgh Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B,...
Player II Player a,b B cdgh Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select all that apply. a. If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that a 2 C b.Ifband d-hthen D is weakly dominated C. If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is a Nash equilibrium. d. Ifa> b and e...
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider...
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
Question 1 a) First consider the following game, where each player plays either C (Confess) or D ...
Question 1 a) First consider the following game, where each player plays either C (Confess) or D (Deny) and the numbers in brackets are the respective payoffs to player 1 and player 2. Player 2 Player 1 (0-12) (-12,0) In relation to the above game outline the concepts of - Dominated strategies - Best responses - Nash equilibrium/equilibria - A prisoner's dilemma b) Define what is meant by subgame perfection and how the concept of credibility can be used to...
answer parts e f g pls 4. Consider the following game presented in the strategic form:...
answer parts e f g pls
4. Consider the following game presented in the strategic form: A B C W X Y Z 8,9 14,9 5,0 1,4 8,0 19,13 7,18 9.16 9,80 33, 335, 130, 84 (a) What is the relationship between an equilibrium concept and predic- tions regarding the outcome of a game? (b) Find all the Nash equilibrium strategy combinations. For each equilib- rium, discuss whether it is or it is not strong dominant strategy equi- librium. (c)...
1. In the game below A chooses rows and B (i) Find all the strategies that...
1. In the game below A chooses rows and B
(i) Find all the strategies that survive iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS)
(ii) Find each player’s best responses and the Nash
Equilibrium
2. Consider the game structure below for the next several
questions:
(i) What must be true about the values of a, b, c, and d in
order for U to be a strictly dominated strategy?
(ii) What must be true about the values of a, b,...
Player II A 4,4 6,3 В 3,5 7,2 Player l Consider the strategic form game above....
Player II A 4,4 6,3 В 3,5 7,2 Player l Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are efficient (Please, select all that apply) a (AD) O c (B,D) d. (А,C)
A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The number of pure...
A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect
information above. The number of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in
the game is? (Please, type only numerical values, for example: 0,
1, 2, 3,....)
B) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect
information above. The following strategy profiles are Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Select all that apply)
a) (WY, AD)
b) (WY, AC)
c) (ZX, AD)
d) (ZY, BC)
e) (ZY, BD)
...
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L...
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Player II A 5,3 3,5 8,5 Player C 6,3 24 8,9 Consider the strategic form game...
Player II A 5,3 3,5 8,5 Player C 6,3 24 8,9 Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are inefficient (Please, select all that apply) b. (A,F C (C,E) d. (B,E) e (B,D) f. (A,D) . (B,F
Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D
are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select
all that apply.
a.
If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is
a Nash equilibrium.
b.
If b > f and d = h then D is weakly dominated.
c.
If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that
.
d.
If a > b...
Player II Player a,b B cdgh Consider the game in strategic form above where A, B, C, and D are strategies and a, b, c, d, e, f, g, and h, are payoffs. Select all that apply. a. If (A,C) is a Nash Equilibrium then it must be that a 2 C b.Ifband d-hthen D is weakly dominated C. If A is weakly dominated and C is weakly dominant then (B,D) is a Nash equilibrium. d. Ifa> b and e...
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
Question 1 a) First consider the following game, where each player plays either C (Confess) or D (Deny) and the numbers in brackets are the respective payoffs to player 1 and player 2. Player 2 Player 1 (0-12) (-12,0) In relation to the above game outline the concepts of - Dominated strategies - Best responses - Nash equilibrium/equilibria - A prisoner's dilemma b) Define what is meant by subgame perfection and how the concept of credibility can be used to...
answer parts e f g pls
4. Consider the following game presented in the strategic form: A B C W X Y Z 8,9 14,9 5,0 1,4 8,0 19,13 7,18 9.16 9,80 33, 335, 130, 84 (a) What is the relationship between an equilibrium concept and predic- tions regarding the outcome of a game? (b) Find all the Nash equilibrium strategy combinations. For each equilib- rium, discuss whether it is or it is not strong dominant strategy equi- librium. (c)...
1. In the game below A chooses rows and B
(i) Find all the strategies that survive iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS)
(ii) Find each player’s best responses and the Nash
Equilibrium
2. Consider the game structure below for the next several
questions:
(i) What must be true about the values of a, b, c, and d in
order for U to be a strictly dominated strategy?
(ii) What must be true about the values of a, b,...
Player II A 4,4 6,3 В 3,5 7,2 Player l Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are efficient (Please, select all that apply) a (AD) O c (B,D) d. (А,C)
A) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect
information above. The number of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in
the game is? (Please, type only numerical values, for example: 0,
1, 2, 3,....)
B) Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect
information above. The following strategy profiles are Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (Select all that apply)
a) (WY, AD)
b) (WY, AC)
c) (ZX, AD)
d) (ZY, BC)
e) (ZY, BD)
...
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Player II A 5,3 3,5 8,5 Player C 6,3 24 8,9 Consider the strategic form game above. In this game, the following strategy profiles are inefficient (Please, select all that apply) b. (A,F C (C,E) d. (B,E) e (B,D) f. (A,D) . (B,F
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